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Fiscal Policy for Recovery 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
A year ago, when the full impact of the financial crisis hit Ireland, it took some time for 
economists to assess what was happening and what were the full implications of the 
disaster. Economic forecasts were changing daily and the huge uncertainty about what 
was actually developing made policy-making exceptionally difficult. However, over the 
course of the winter and early spring economists came to understand what was happening 
in Ireland and the outside world somewhat better. In May, with colleagues in the ESRI, 
we published a paper (Bergin et al., 2009) which considered the possible paths to 
recovery for the Irish economy. This analysis suggested that the Irish economy, while 
suffering major permanent damage as a consequence of the recession, would return to a 
period of quite rapid growth once the world economy itself entered the recovery phase. 
At the time of publishing the recovery in the world economy was only a gleam in the 
economists’ eye. However, over the last six months there have been increasing signs of a 
return, if not to business as usual in the world economy, at least to limited growth. 
This paper considers the role of fiscal policy in ensuring that this recovery takes place in 
Ireland and that the economy is returned to its potential output. However, before 
considering policy for the future it is important first to understand the nature of the policy 
failure that has landed us where we are today. Section 2 of this paper discusses some 
aspects of this policy failure. Section 3 then discusses the potential growth rate of the 
Irish economy and it considers the possible paths to recovery. The final section of this 
paper discusses some of the policy options needed to restore the economy to a sustainable 
growth path. 
Section 2 Getting Here 
In considering how we got into this mess in Ireland it is useful to look back and consider 
the source of the policy failures. To what extent were wrong or dangerous policies 
adopted since 2000 because of a lack of information about what was happening and how 
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the economy worked and to what extent was it due to a failure to follow good policy 
advice? The answer to this question can help us develop a more robust policy-making 
process in the next decade.  
There were two major policy failures that contributed to the current Irish economic 
disaster. (Ireland could not have prevented the world financial collapse, which has 
contributed so much to the economy’s current woes). The first was the failure to ensure 
that the domestic financial system was operated in a prudent manner and the second was 
the failure to manage domestic demand, in particular the failure to prevent the 
development of a property market bubble. 
With the benefit of hindsight the collapse of the domestic financial system could and 
should have been prevented by the financial regulator – IFSRA, more recently re-branded 
as Financial Regulator. The complete failure of IFSRA to either see the increasingly 
dangerous exposure of the system from the middle years of the decade or to take action to 
prevent it has landed us in the current mess. Honohan, 2009, has documented some of the 
problems and failures. However, even if the IFSRA failed in its task what about external 
oversight of the system? 
For those working within the financial system it was not easy or realistic to expect them 
to cry foul in public. It is certainly clear that, even if they had misgivings, they did not act 
on them in managing their own businesses. However, the wider academic community 
also paid little heed to these risks. In the case of the ESRI we had scant resources to 
devote to researching or monitoring the domestic financial system. Similarly those doing 
research in financial economics tended to concentrate on areas of interest other than 
financial stability.1 One suspects that the Department of Finance, like the academic 
community, also relied on IFSRA and the Central Bank over the same period to do the 
work, allocating very limited resources to monitoring developments in the financial 
system.  
                                                 
1 The work of Honohan was a notable exception see, for example, Honohan, and Klingebiel,2003. 
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Even with the limited resources devoted to the area, some concerns began to be expressed 
from late 2005 onwards about developments in the financial system. For example, in the 
ESRI Medium-Term Review published in December 2005 the effects of a possible 
housing price collapse was examined. The authors commented: 
“In addition, this scenario assumes that the financial sector would prove to be 
robust in the face of the major shock to the housing sector and the very rapid 
doubling in the unemployment rate. Should significant problems arise due to the 
high level of household indebtedness this could greatly complicate the recovery 
process.” 
While the possibility of a financial crisis was adverted to, this concern was not given 
much attention. In October 2006, a paper given at this conference by a colleague (later 
published in the ESRI QEC as Traistaru-Siedschlag, 2007) raised concerns about 
financial stability. These concerns were reiterated later in an Irish Times article by Kelly 
at the end of 2006 and subsequently in a paper by him in the ESRI QEC in mid 2007. 
However, even then the focus of attention of the economic community remained on the 
housing market rather than on the risks to the financial system. It was really only from 
the end of 2007 that very real concerns were being discussed in private, and even then it 
was felt to be difficult to air them in public without having undertaken the necessary 
background research.2 
Looking back on this record I would conclude that while the primary failure in policy 
rests with the responsible authority which had all the resources needed to undertake its 
task – IFSRA – the wider economics community did not devote attention to the topic in 
the years preceding the crisis.  Of course, these comments apply to the economics 
community in many other economies too.    
The other crucial ingredient of the current crisis is the growth and bursting of the 
property bubble. The factors driving this bubble, the very serious consequences arising 
                                                 
2 There was also the danger of legal action if too trenchant views were expressed on the stability of an 
individual bank. 
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from the bubble bursting, and the policy responses that would have prevented it are 
discussed in Conefrey and FitzGerald, 2009.  
While policy makers can with some validity claim that their slumbers on the job of 
regulating the financial system were not disturbed by any outside noises, this is not true 
about the failure to manage the housing market. As far back as 2001 the ESRI warned 
about the need under EMU for governments to use fiscal policy to prevent property 
market bubbles occurring. Specifically we suggested that the withdrawal of mortgage 
interest relief with the possible additional imposition of a tax on mortgage interest 
payments as the best mechanism to use for this purpose (FitzGerald, 2001 and Barry and 
FitzGerald, 2001). 
Over the last twenty years each of our Medium-Term Reviews has referred to some 
relevant story from classical Greek mythology in the introduction. In the 2003 Review we 
began with the story of Icarus. At the time we were concerned that unduly expansionary 
fiscal policy, specifically the failure to control the housing market, meant that the Irish 
economy was flying to close to the sun. Like Daedalus this warning was ignored! The 
introduction to the 2005 Review contained the following passage: 
When Odysseus undertook his long voyage home from Troy he encountered many 
dangers. Not least were the distractions that the Lotus-eaters provided for his crew.  
“They …. went about among the Lotus-eaters, who did them no hurt, but gave them to eat of the 
lotus, which was so delicious that those who ate of it left off caring about home. .” HOMER, 
Odyssey, Book IX, vss. 83-104 
The lure of good times with the Lotus-eaters nearly derailed the voyage and tough 
measures had to be taken by Odysseus to get the crew back on board.  
“I forced them back to the ships and made them fast under the benches. ….. so they took their places 
and smote the grey sea with their oars.” HOMER, Odyssey, Book IX, vss. 83-104 
In that Review the authors went on to simulate the economic effects of a 30% fall in 
house prices (which would have left prices well below where they are forecast to be next 
year). This analysis suggested that if the property market bubble was not deflated in a 
controlled manner, unemployment could rise to 11% on the bursting of the bubble. 
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These concerns for the risks the economy was running through the adoption of 
inappropriate fiscal policy were repeated in many other ESRI publications, including 
many issues of the Quarterly Economic Commentary. Thus, whatever about the failure to 
foresee the risks to the financial system, the risks arising from a property market bubble 
bursting were well flagged. 
Quite often when mistakes are made the word goes out – “the media did not report it”. In 
this case I believe that that is not true. Brendan Keenan in the Irish Independent, Paul 
Tansey in the Irish Times and George Lee in RTE all reported on the research that 
pointed to impending dangers for the Irish economy associated with the housing market. 
Not only did they “report” but in their comment they placed their own emphasis and 
interpretation as to the source and gravity of the problems facing the Irish economy. 
For example, the Irish Independent in its editorial the morning after our Review was 
published in 2005 said: 
“No one will be accusing the ESRI of a surfeit of seasonal spirit this Christmas, thanks to the 
gloomy report on the economy it issued yesterday. So is it a case of Bah Humbug? Has Ebeneezer 
Scrooge taken up residence in the ESRI offices? Time will tell, but there is a great deal in this 
report that we should be chewing on with the turkey. An obvious point is that a boom which is 
increasingly reliant on a high level of activity in the construction sector, cannot go on forever.” 
The following day Brendan Keenan went on to say: 
“Builders and estate agents yesterday took issue with the claims by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI) that the property market poses a threat to the economy and should be 
cooled down.  …. The ESRI recommended an immediate end to tax reliefs for property and 
possible introduction of a property tax and abolition of mortgage interest relief.  … 
The 2008 Review did not anticipate the world financial collapse and, as a result, greatly 
underestimated the adverse impact on Ireland of the economic crisis. Because of its 
timing, this failure to anticipate the recession did not affect policy. By then the damage 
had been done with the property market already collapsing. With the benefit of hindsight 
the forecasts proved much too optimistic. 
There were many factors behind the failure to heed Cassandra’s warnings. After a decade 
of generally high growth and low unemployment there was a growing feeling among 
households and companies that the Irish economy was invincible – many people did not 
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want to hear the message.3For those in the financial sector and the building sector the 
prospect of profits today clouded their judgement. However, there was a more general 
problem that the traditional understanding of the role of fiscal policy was no longer 
central to public discourse on economic policy. Much attention focused on the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). However, as argued in Conefrey and FitzGerald, 2009, the SGP 
was not the appropriate policy target for Ireland and Spain. Rather, they should have run 
substantial budget surpluses and taken specific measures to choke off demand for 
property.4 In addition, the belief was often expressed in Ireland that fiscal policy fine 
tuning, like monetary policy fine tuning, was neither possible nor wise. While this may 
be true under some circumstances, when faced with the problems of excess demand in 
Ireland and Spain it was not a case of fine tuning. What was needed was significant 
deflationary action. 
It is a wider question for political scientists and historians, which I will not try to address 
here, as to why policy makers chose to ignore the warning signs in relation to property. 
Action to control the property market would undoubtedly have been unpopular. In 
particular, there is a continuing refrain that taxing mortgage interest payments would be 
unthinkable. While this issue is now irrelevant, the experience could be repeated in 
different ways in the future.5 Many non-economists expect economists to produce 
palatable medicine. When unpalatable medicine is prescribed it is automatically rejected. 
In the 1980s it took many years for reality to sink in and for enough painful medicine to 
be taken. The concern this time round for economists and policy makers is both about 
preparing the right prescription for the Irish economy as well as communicating the need 
for the unpleasant medicine to a very unhappy patient. 
                                                 
3 That people did not want to face up to the economic reality was evident in the discourse in the 2007 
General Election, where both the government and opposition parties talked of a continuing boom. 
4 Blanchard, 2001, recommended tighter fiscal policy for Spain. 
5 For example, ruling out property taxes because they are “unthinkable”. 
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Section 3: How the Economy Works 
In considering the appropriate medicine to prescribe for Ireland’s current economic ills a 
key issue is what is the potential growth rate of the economy: how fast could it grow in a 
recovery? Economies can underperform and grow more slowly than their potential but 
they cannot exceed that potential on a sustained basis. The job of policy in the coming 
years is to ensure that the potential growth of the Irish economy is realised (and even 
enhanced). 
The potential output of the economy is also very important in assessing the significance 
of the level of government borrowing. Currently the economy is well below its level of 
potential output – with the labour force and capital stock available it could produce much 
more. However, that potential has itself been significantly damaged by the recession – the 
capital stock has been adversely affected, as manifested by the dramatic fall in 
investment. As discussed later, with a world recovery and a re-pricing by Ireland to make 
the economy competitive, output could be expected to return to potential. Our estimate is 
that as of today (before next year’s budget), the general government deficit could fall to 
roughly half its current level with an economic recovery. Thus the task of fiscal 
adjustment to restore balance to the public finances involves increases in taxation and 
cuts in expenditure over the coming years to cut the borrowing by around 6 per cent of 
GDP, rather than the over 12 per cent of the GGB for this year. However, this estimate is 
conditional on the measure of the potential output of the economy we are using being 
correct. 
The measure of potential output in an economy is important for a number of reasons. It 
measures how fast an economy can grow under “normal” circumstances. The relationship 
between the actual level of output and the potential output of an economy is a guide to 
the sustainability of the current level of activity. Where output is above potential it 
suggests the presence of inflationary pressures, making such a level of activity 
unsustainable. Where output is below potential it gives an indication of how much of the 
underemployment of resources in an economy (e.g. unemployment) is temporary in 
nature. 
8 
As outlined above, the measure of potential output is used to establish the normal or 
cyclically adjusted budget deficit. The cyclically adjusted deficit (or surplus) on the 
government accounts is the government sector’s balance at a “normal” level of activity – 
potential output. Where there would be a significant deficit if the economy were 
operating at potential this deficit is defined as being structural.  
There are a number of different ways of measuring the potential output of the economy. 
All of these methods aim to show what the maximum normal level of output would be 
given the endowment of resources in the economy. Some of them take account of the 
specific structure and factor endowments of an economy while others are little more than 
a rule of thumb. 
One popular measure of potential output is derived using a production function for an 
economy. Such a function describes how a given mix of inputs [physical and human 
capital, materials and technology] can be combined to produce national output. It is 
always possible for an economy to produce within the production frontier described by 
the production function. However, where that happens it means that the economy is 
producing less output than would be feasible with the available mix of inputs. It is not 
physically possible for an economy to produce more than the limit described by the 
production function for any sustained period of time. 
This method is used by the EU Commission. However, they impose a specific type of 
production function – a Cobb Douglas – which assumes that the share of labour (and 
capital) in value added is constant. They also assume the same fixed factor shares for all 
EU-15 countries. In Ireland’s case the share of labour is not fixed, it has fallen over time. 
The EU average labour share is very far from the actual share in the case of Ireland. In 
addition, the EU Commission estimate the labour input consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. However, this methodology is highly questionable when applied to Ireland 
because of the elasticity of labour supply through migration. Finally, Total Factor 
Productivity is measured by a moving average process which will have major difficulties 
handling a recession as deep as the current one. For all of these reasons the EU 
methodology (also used by the Department of Finance in their Stability Programme) is 
not really appropriate when applied to the Irish economy. 
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A second way of characterising the production technology of an economy is as a cost 
function. Theory shows that under a range of maintained assumptions, for any production 
function there exists a cost function that represents the same technology (is dual to it). A 
cost function describes how the factors of production can be combined to produce a given 
level of output at minimum cost. Firms are then assumed to maximise profits through 
choosing the appropriate level of output in Ireland. This measure of potential output is 
implemented in Bergin et al., 2009, using the HERMES macroeconomic model of the 
Irish economy. Eight of the eleven productive sectors of the economy represented in the 
model are characterised by an individual cost function. For a given set of factor prices 
these cost functions describe the least cost combination of inputs to produce a given 
output. The optimal or potential output is that which maximises the profitability of the 
firms producing in each sector. In the short run the technology assumes that capital is 
fixed and firms optimise their mix of inputs to produce the desired level of output. In the 
long run firms adjust the capital stock to minimise the long-run cost of producing their 
optimal level of output. 
A third method, developed and used in the 1970s, assumed that the maximum levels of 
output actually observed in each cycle of the economy represented the maximum 
potential output at that point in time (Kenny, 1995). The potential output in intervening 
periods was derived by interpolation. However, this methodology suffered from major 
problems because of the need to project the growth in potential output beyond the last 
peak to cover the current period. 
A fourth simple approach takes a moving average of past output to determine the trend or 
potential output. However, this method also suffers from the problem that past behaviour 
may not be a good indicator of the potential output of the economy in the future, 
especially when the endowment of labour and capital are changing rapidly. 
For these reasons I believe that the approach used in Bergin et al., 2009, using the 
HERMES model of the Irish economy, provides a better guide to the potential output of 
the Irish economy than the other methods. It does have the disadvantage that it is based 
on a large model of the economy which is difficult to summarise and not as transparent as 
the other methods. However, it takes account of the endogeneity of the labour supply 
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through migration and also of the fact that wage rates and other factor prices are also 
endogenous. 
Rather similar results can be derived using a simple decomposition of the contribution to 
the growth rate by the different factors of production. This approach has the advantage of 
simplicity. As indicated above, this assumes a simple production function for the 
economy and underlies the approach to measuring potential output used by a number of 
authorities, including the EU Commission. In this example, the productive capital stock is 
taken to exclude the stock of housing. To allow for the fact that unemployed labour 
represents a potential resource we use the growth in the labour force rather than the 
growth in actual employment. We also allow for the impact of the increasing human 
capital of the labour force (see Durkan, Fitzgerald and Harmon, 1999; Bergin and 
Kearney, 2007 and Fitz Gerald (ed.), 2008). 
 In this case the contribution of productive capital (excluding housing) and labour (here 
taken to be the labour force) are weighted by their actual shares in value added. The 
results for this measure are shown in Table 1. This application of the methodology differs 
from that of the EU Commission in a number of ways. In particular, where we assume 
varying weights for the different factors of production the EU assumes constant shares 
applicable to the EU as a whole rather than just to Ireland. 
Table 1: Production Function Measure of Potential Output 
           
 
1970-
75 
1975-
80 
1980-
85 
1985-
90 
1990-
95 
1995-
00 
2000-
05 
2005-
10 
2010-
15 
2015-
20 
Capital  1.3 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.7 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 
Labour Force 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 
Human Capital 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
TFP smoothed 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Total contribution 4.5 5.2 4.3 3.4 4.5 6.9 5.5 4.2 3.4 3.8 
GDP 4.8 5.3 1.8 3.6 4.2 9.3 5.5 0.3 5.7 3.2 
Index 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.97 0.97 0.80 0.89 0.87 
           
In this case Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is not the actual rate of TFP observed in each 
period. Instead we have used smoothed values which roughly reflect the averages for two 
different periods of growth. For the period up to 2000, when the economy was catching 
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up with the rest of the EU-15, it was quite high. However, we assumed that post 2000 the 
rate has been halved. However, what is not taken account of in Table 1 is the permanent 
loss of output the economy has suffered as a result of the current recession. 
When the contributions of the different factors (including TFP) are added, they do not 
sum to the actual growth in GDP. This reflects the fact that over the last thirty years the 
economy experienced periods of growth above potential and periods when it grew below 
potential. This is captured in the Index at the bottom of the table. The permanent loss of 
output as a result of the current recession sees the Index remaining around 0.9 in the 
period 2010-20.  
What this analysis suggests is that output will fall to almost 20 per cent below what it 
would have been without the crisis. However, in the recovery it has the potential to grow 
quite rapidly for a period making up around half of the lost ground. As shown in the table 
this would see a temporary rise in the average growth rate to between 5 and 6 per cent 
over the period 2010 to 2015. This is the potential: the job of policy is to ensure that the 
economy realises this potential by addressing the obstacles in terms of the public finance 
crisis and the serious lack of competitiveness.  
On this basis Bergin et al., 2009, looked at two scenarios. Both scenarios assumed that 
the government implements the 2010 budget along the lines set out in the April 2009 
budget: taking roughly 3 per cent of GDP out of the economy. Two alternatives for the 
world economy were considered – one where the world economy recovers next year 
(which now seems most likely) and another where the world recovery does not 
commence till 2011. Table 2 sets out the forecasts from that paper based on the world 
recovery happening next year. While the numbers shown for 2009 and 2010 have been 
taken from the latest Quarterly Economic Commentary they would not greatly change the 
numbers for 2011-15. 
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Table 2: World Recovery Scenario: Major Aggregates 
 2009 2010 2010-15 2015-20 
 Annual % Growth Rate Average Annual % Growth 
GDP -7.2 -1.1 5.6 3.3 
GNP -8.7 -1.9 5.4 3.2 
Total Employment -7.9 -4.1 3.0 1.1 
Non-agricultural Wage Rates -1.0 -2.5 3.2 4.2 
Year End: 2009 2010        2015       2020 
Personal Savings Ratio 11.9 11.6 8.5 7.1 
General Government Balance, % GDP -12.9 -12.8 -3.3 -2.4 
Balance of Payments, % GNP -1.2 1.8 3.5 4.0 
Note: The figures for 2009 and 2010 are taken from the latest Quarterly Economic Commentary. The 
figures for 2010-15 and 2015-20 are taken from Bergin, et al., 2009 and are not fully consistent with the 
more recent QEC figures.  
 
The key points that I would draw from this analysis about the period 2011 to 2015 are: 
• The Irish economy can recover some, but not all, of the lost ground due to the 
current economic crisis. If the economy has the potential to grow at 3 pr cent a 
year this implies significantly higher growth in actual than in potential output in 
the recovery phase from 2011 to 2015. 
• It will take quite a number of years to move the economy back towards full 
employment. Even with favourable adjustment in labour costs it could be 2015-17 
before full employment is restored. 
• The return to growth (plus the assumed 2010 Budget) will eliminate most, but not 
all, of the current government deficit. Between 2011 and 2015 there will have to 
be some further moderate tightening of fiscal policy to return the public finances 
to a sustainable path. However, the analysis suggests that this fiscal action would 
be more limited than that envisaged by the Department of Finance last April. 
• The personal savings ratio is currently very high. Together with the dramatic fall 
in investment (to 15% of GDP), the government’s large borrowing, and the move 
into balance of payments surplus, this means that the private sector of the 
economy is acquiring financial assets (or repaying loans) at a very rapid rate. 
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The move into balance of payments surplus has major implications for the economy and 
the sustainability of the recovery, especially in the banking system. With the government 
borrowing over 12 per cent of GDP next year, the balance of payments surplus will mean 
that the private sector will be net acquiring foreign assets (or repaying debts) amounting 
to over 13 per cent of GDP. While some of this will be accounted for by net foreign 
direct investment, the bulk of it over the coming years is likely to be accounted for by 
changes in the net stocks of foreign financial assets and liabilities. It is likely that quite a 
lot of this will flow through the banking system. This would mean that the banking 
system would be repaying its net foreign liabilities at a rapid rate. If it were to continue 
for a number of years, the banking sector would have repaid all its net foreign liabilities 
by the middle of the next decade.  
When such a pattern becomes well established it will change the international perceptions 
of the Irish banking system. If suitably recapitalised and if the problem of dud assets is 
dealt with, it would allow the banks to wean themselves off dependence on the ECB for 
liquidity. However, this will not happen just on the basis of such forecasts. It will only be 
when the recovery in the economy is well established from 2011 onwards that credibility 
can be restored. Actions speak louder than forecasts! 
Section 4: Fiscal Policy for Recovery 
The background to fiscal policy is that the Irish economy is quite uncompetitive. While 
consumer prices are adjusting downwards there is little evidence to date that other prices, 
including the price of labour, are adjusting. The failure to foresee this fall in prices meant 
that the inflation rates underlying the budgets for 2009 were much too high. The lack of 
competitiveness of the economy and the possibility that there could be a further 
deflationary surprise next year needs to be kept in mind in formulating fiscal policy. 
In public discourse much attention now focuses on what taxes should or should not be 
increased and what expenditures should or should not be cut. There is a dash to detail 
avoiding an important discussion that is needed about the big picture. Too often in 
discussing budgets in the past this attention to detail has been the centre of attention. This 
is part of our problem today. If more attention had been given in the past to the 
inappropriate stance of fiscal policy, as set out in the Stability Programme Update 
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accompanying each Budget document on budget day, we might not be in the mess we are 
in today. 
The framework for fiscal policy should begin with the medium term prospects for the 
economy. We can work back from that to the immediate policy issues facing government, 
especially on the budget. Before we can determine the appropriate path of fiscal policy 
over the next five years we must first decide on what is the long run level of public 
services that we want. Then the tax level will have to be set at an appropriate level to 
fund that level of services.  
It is essentially a political question as to what level of public services and investment is 
likely to be “desired” by the public in the next decade. Currently we are looking at 
government expenditure approaching 55 per cent of GNP, a level last reached in 1988. 
However, the recovery in the economy would see this ratio fall significantly in the 
medium term. If the long term acceptable level of government expenditure were to settle 
around 45 per cent of GNP, roughly the 1995 level, then some moderate increase in the 
tax level would still be required from the current position. To achieve the related level of 
expenditure would, in turn, require substantially greater cuts in current expenditure (than 
increases in taxation) from the current level. If instead the target level were 40 per cent of 
GNP, dramatic cut backs in expenditure (and services) would be required over the 
coming years, while allowing significant cuts in taxation from today’s level. My own 
preference would be to target a level of expenditure and revenue in the medium term 
equivalent to 45 per cent of GDP.  However, every government has to make its own mind 
up on this issue. Whatever that target is should inform the composition of the next 
budget.  
If the analysis in the last Section is correct, over the next five years a structural deficit of 
6 or 7 per cent of GDP rests to be eliminated. While a less daunting task than supposed 
by the Department of Finance last April, it is nonetheless a huge problem and it will be 
very painful to achieve. A key question is how rapidly this is to be done.  
There is a substantial international debate about this issue. On the one hand there is the 
traditional Keynesian argument that fiscal policy should be countercyclical. On the other 
there are a series of arguments that suggest that for Ireland, if not for many other 
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countries, the option of adopting a countercyclical policy is not available because of the 
gravity of the fiscal crisis. Past mistakes precluded this option for today’s government. 
Essentially the question is how much of the heavy lifting should be done in the 2010 
budget and how much left for the future?  
An argument for delay is that doing more now pushes unemployment even higher in the 
short run. If there is a ratchet in unemployment then you end up with higher 
unemployment over a prolonged period than you might get from a more gradual 
adjustment. I don't buy the simple Keynesian model - expectations and confidence matter 
- and I also don't buy such extreme hysteresis in unemployment.  
The lessons drawn from the experience of Ireland in the 1980s and of Finland in the 
1990s suggest, instead, the importance of taking action rapidly. A major factor in the 
recession in Ireland, and a particularly important factor in the fall in employment, is the 
collapse in domestic demand. At present consumers are scared and are saving like mad. 
Households and businesses have stopped investing. There will be no major recovery in 
employment till the domestic private sector recovers its confidence. At present we all 
know that we are facing a crisis. Many employees are uncertain whether they will have 
jobs tomorrow. Many are also uncertain what their after tax income will be tomorrow. 
Over the last year this uncertainty has been driven by forces other than domestic fiscal 
policy. However, with a world recovery, over the coming years a very big factor in 
consumers’ and investors’ confidence will be their expectations of the burdens to be 
placed on them by future fiscal policy. 
If it is right that one big push on fiscal policy would be enough to set the economy and 
the public finances on a recovery path then, once that recovery is established in 2011 and 
2012, domestic demand will recover. However, if the private sector faces further years of 
uncertainty as to what the cuts will be and what will be the increase in the tax burden, 
then confidence will be very slow to return delaying a return of actual output to its 
potential level. 
Tough action now is likely to result in enhanced confidence in financial markets about 
the sustainability of the Irish recovery. In turn, this could see a fall in the risk premium 
for lending or investing in Ireland, helping cut the cost of capital for both government and 
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private investors. Delay in tackling the fiscal problems would be likely to add to such 
costs, postponing the recovery. Also the potential growth rate of the economy in the long 
term is dependent on the growth in the capital stock. A higher cost of capital will see a 
lower capital stock in the long term and a slower growth in potential output.  
Fiscal policy should be formulated on a “no regrets” basis. The forecasts presented above 
come with wide margins of error. What if the recovery scenario did not happen and it was 
2012 before the light appeared at the end of the tunnel (the alternative scenario 
considered in Bergin et al., 2009a)? Under those circumstances a second tough budget 
would be needed in 2011 and a tough budget in 2010 would not have been “wasted”. If, 
on the other hand, the recovery proved more robust than suggested above, it would mean 
that the 2010 budget might be the last major deflationary budget but it would still not 
have gone “too far”.  
Conclusion 1: the proposed adjustment for 2010 set out in the April 2009 budget is about 
right (an ex ante cut in the deficit of around 3 per cent of GDP). If it is accomplished it 
will do half, but not all, of the work of restoring the public finances to sustainability. 
Given such a budget for 2010 designed to take roughly €5 billion out of the economy 
what should its composition be? 
Our model of the labour market suggests that nominal wage rates should fall by 7% over 
3 years FitzGerald et al., 2008). This means that wages are currently above their long-run 
equilibrium level. Our model of the labour market also implies that in the long run the 
bulk of the incidence of taxes, including employers’ and employees’ social insurance 
contributions, will fall on business. However, where employees wages are above the 
equilibrium level already it would be expected that more of the incidence would fall on 
employees. This means that the negative effect of taxes on labour in the short run will be 
less than in the long run. However, in the long run the disadvantages of taxes on labour 
should still hold.  
Conclusion 2: In choosing increases in taxation in the 2010 budget it would be best to 
avoid increasing taxes on labour in the medium term. As the Commission on Taxation 
has suggested, a carbon tax and a property tax would be much more beneficial. However, 
we also need to keep in mind that labour taxes in Ireland up to 2008 were very low for 
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those people on average or below average incomes (Lane 2008). If the increase in 
taxation in 2010 is less than the 2009 budget envisaged (2.5 billion) it would be 
appropriate to have some further increase in taxation in subsequent years to bring tax 
revenue close to 45 per cent of GDP. 
Conclusion 3: Given the temporary disequilibrium in the labour market, with wage rates 
being too high, there is an argument for temporarily shifting some of the burden from 
employers’ social insurance contributions to employees’ or to income tax. Under normal 
conditions this would achieve little (because the incidence of all taxes on labour is 
ultimately largely on business) but under current conditions, where wage rates are above 
the equilibrium, there is little chance of employees seeking and getting compensation in 
terms of higher wages. Such a rebalancing would mimic the effect of a wage cut on 
competitiveness. 
With the prospect of a return to growth in the next decade it is important to maintain a 
consistent approach to public investment. The level of investment in the boom was 
clearly much too high (FitzGerald and Morgenroth, 2006). However, there is a danger 
that it will fall below its optimal level because of discontinuities and time lags in writing 
and implementing contracts. The composition of the investment should be examined to 
ensure it produces the maximum impact on the productive capacity of the economy (and 
hence on employment in the long term). Public investment should not be seen as a way of 
generating jobs in the short term. As Morgenroth, 2009, has shown, it is not a good way 
to create jobs and putting jobs first is likely to produce less valuable investment and 
fewer sustainable jobs in the medium term. 
Conclusion 4: adjust to a stable level of infrastructural investment. This is likely to be 
4% of GNP, or possibly slightly higher. 
On expenditure the aim should be to increase efficiency with a minimum impact on 
services. This will probably mean that the cuts can not be implemented instantaneously 
where they involve significant reorganisation. Don’t go for the easy cuts – go for those 
which will improve efficiency. Don’t cut services where they are likely to reappear by 
popular demand when the good times come again. 
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The size of the required reduction in current expenditure in the long run may approach 
the cuts in McCarthy (€5 billion). However, this is more than is required or would be 
appropriate in terms of making the adjustment to borrowing, identified above, for 2010. 
However, if you don’t do it now then it will be very difficult to do it in 2013 - it will be 
difficult to keep on making cuts when the economy is in recovery mode. Cuts in 
expenditure now, with an agreed reform package, may well be the only way to achieve 
long-term reform. 
Conclusion 5:  Cuts in current expenditure in 2010 of more than the €1.5 billion 
indicated in the April 2009 Budget would be appropriate. It would be desirable if some of 
the cuts involved restructuring, where the cuts happened over a two year period – 
delivering a further significant cut in 2011. If an irrevocable process can be entered into 
which delivered a cut of say €2 billion to €2.5 billion in 2010 and a further cut of €1 
billion to €1.5 billion in 2011 this would go a substantial way to achieving the necessary 
medium-term targets for reducing current expenditure. The pain of the decision would be 
front end loaded while the implementation would be achieved more efficiently over a two 
year period. Also it would probably ensure that the balance of fiscal tightening between 
2010 and 2011 was appropriate  
In considering what to do about welfare a very important issue will be to redesign the 
welfare system so it is fit for purpose over the recovery period. At present the crude 
replacement rate is at an all time high. Today it is probably not causing people to give up 
jobs. However, in the future it will deter some of those who are unemployed taking new 
relatively low paid jobs. (This is also true of the minimum wage.) Changes should be 
made to try and reduce the danger of poverty traps. At its simplest this would involve an 
actual cut in welfare rates. However, more indirect ways of getting the same result would 
seem preferable. In formulating policy on welfare, account also needs to be taken of the 
results in Jennings et al., 2009, which show that the fall in prices for those on welfare, 
though significant, has been less than that for the population as a whole. 
When it comes to child benefit there is a very strong argument for taxing it rather than 
setting income limits, which would result in very high marginal withdrawal rates over 
certain ranges (Callan, 2009). (The analysis above would count the revenue from taxation 
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of child benefit as part of the savings on expenditure, not as a replacement for other 
increases in taxation.) An intermediate policy would be to cut child benefit to save the 
same amount. However, this would have a significantly greater impact on poor families 
with children than would the taxation option. If any other measures were taken affecting 
welfare payments it could give rise to large unplanned impacts on some families already 
in poverty. 
Conclusion 6: The welfare system needs to be prepared for a world where wage rates and 
prices are lower than they were in 2008. It needs to be redesigned so it does not create 
poverty traps or hinder a return to work.  This is an entirely new challenge for policy 
which has for five decades been formulated in a context of rising wage rates and prices. 
My own view is that the 7% public service pay cut in March has made a significant dent 
in the difference between public and private differentials, while still leaving a substantial 
public sector premium. The tacit acceptance by the public sector of these cuts was quite a 
remarkable recognition of the crisis which the economy faces. It is very hard to find a 
similar adjustment in recent history in the OECD area, with or without industrial unrest.  
To achieve the necessary improvement in the competitiveness of the economy we need a 
further cut in wage rates across the board, public and private of at least 5%. The delivery 
of such a reduction in the public sector would be greatly facilitated if it was clear that 
such cuts were taking place in the private sector. 
Section 5: Conclusion 
Today the task of the Irish government is like that of Odysseus – the population will have 
to go back to the oars in a very unpleasant sea! Whether the crew will mutiny and fire 
Odysseus remains to be seen. 
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